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Abstract  
The purpose of this paper is to introduce and adopt a generalised version of Roemer's (1998) Equality of 
Opportunity (EOp) framework, which we call extended EOp, for analysing second-best optimal income taxation. 
Unlike the pure EOp criterion of Roemer (1998) the extended EOp criterion allows for alternative weighting 
profiles in the treatment of income differentials between as well as within types when types are defined by 
circumstances that are beyond people's control. This study uses parental education as a measure of exogenous 
circumstances. An empirical microeconometric model of labour supply in Italy is employed to simulate and 
identify income tax-transfer rules that are optimal according to the extended EOp criterion. We look for second-
best optimality, i.e. the tax-transfer rules are not allowed to depend on family background, they only depend on 
income: family background is taken indirectly into account. The rules are defined by a universal (not 
individualized) lump-sum transfer (positive or negative) and by one or two marginal tax rates. A rather striking 
result of the analysis is that the optimal tax-transfer rule turns out to be a universal lump-sum tax (with marginal 
tax rates equal to zero), under Roemer's pure EOp criterion as well as under the generalised EOp criterion with 
moderate degrees of aversion to within-type inequality. A higher degree of within-type inequality aversion 
instead produces EOp-optimal rules with positive marginal tax rates. When the EOp-version of the Gini welfare 
function is adopted, the optimal tax rule turns out to be close to the actual 1993 Italian tax system, if not for the 
important difference of prescribing a universal lump-sum positive transfer of 3,500,000 ITL (= 1807 Euros), 
which has no comparable counterpart in the actual system. On the other hand, when using the conventional 
equality of outcome (EO) criterion, the pure lump-sum tax always turns out to be optimal, at least with respect to 
the classes of two- and three-parameter rules. We also compute optimal rules under the additional constraint that 
universal lump-sum taxes are not feasible. Overall, the results do not conform to the perhaps common 
expectation that the EO criterion is more supportive of “interventionist” (redistributive) policies than an 
extended EOp approach. 
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 1. Introduction 
There is large research evidence regarding the impact of family background (e.g. parental education 
and/or income) on the economic success or, more generally, the level of well-being attained by the off-
spring. The hypotheses on the channels through which the effect takes place can vary, but the 
existence of the effect itself is well-established.1  In the terminology used in Roemer’s theory of 
Equality of Opportunity (EOp)2, family background belongs to the category of the “circumstances”, 
i.e. something beyond the individual’s control. The EOp-criterion is interesting from the policy point-
of-view, since the majority of citizens in most industrialised countries, although not unfavourable to 
redistribution, seem sensitive to the way a certain outcome has been attained. If the level of well-being 
attained by a given individual is seen as depending on her circumstances (such as family background) 
and her own effort, the policies inspired  by the EOp criterion should account for the impact of the part 
of well-being attributable to circumstances (rather than to effort) on the distribution of well-being. In 
contrast, the policies inspired by the criterion of equality of achievement or Equality of Outcome (EO) 
should care about the distribution of well-being irrespective of whether is originated by circumstances 
or by effort.  Although the EOp criterion does not necessarily imply less redistribution than the EO 
criterion, redistribution is more likely to receive support if it is designed to correct circumstances that 
are beyond people’s control. On the other hand, if a bad outcome is associated with a lack of effort, 
redistribution is likely to be much less acceptable. In designing EOp-inspired mechanisms, besides 
direct interventions such as targeted income support, educational services etc. one can also consider 
indirect policies such as income taxation. In this paper we address the following question: What’s the 
optimal income tax-transfer rule from the EOp perspective?  More specifically, we present an 
empirical analysis of second-best optimal income taxation, adopting Equality of Opportunity (EOp) as 
the evaluation criterion.  
 The main purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of adopting the EOp criterion 
for the design of tax-transfer systems as compared to the EO criterion. A secondary purpose is to 
extend a previous contribution (Roemer et al. 2003), where the EOp criterion has been applied to 
evaluate the performance of current income tax rules in various countries, using a relatively simple 
common model of labour supply behaviour with calibrated parameters. The present paper extends the 
previous study in several respects.  
                                                     
1 Behrman et al. (1999), Ermish and Francesconi (2002), Sacerdote (2002), Dustman (2004).  
2 Roemer (1998). 
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 First, instead of evaluating the current tax rules, we wish to determine the second-best 
optimal income tax rules (according to the EOp perspective). As in Mirrlees (1071), second-best 
optimality means that we limit ourselves to tax-transfer rules that depend only on income i.e. we 
assume that individual-specific lump-sum taxes are not feasible, nor can the tax-transfer rule depend 
on (observable) circumstances or “types”.  Our aim consists of identifying the tax-transfers rule that 
best conforms to the EOp criterion, assuming that the rule depends only on income.  There are many 
examples in tax policy analysis or design where a similar second-best perspective in adopted. For 
example it is frequently asked whether the tax rule is more or less favourable to men rather than to 
women, to singles rather than to couples, to the young rather than to the elderly etc., even though the 
(actual or perspective) tax rule does not (directly) depend on those characteristics.   
 Second, we introduce an extended version of Roemer’s (1998) pure EOp-criterion which can 
be considered as a combination of the pure EOp criterion and the more traditional Equality-of-
Outcome (EO) criterion.  
 Third, we employ a relatively sophisticated model of labour supply that provides a 
simultaneous treatment of partners’ decisions and accounts for quantity constraints on the distribution 
of hours.  
 Finally, while the analysis in Roemer et al. (2003) only concerned male heads of household 
25-40 year old, this study deals with approximately the entire labour force. Whilst most tax 
evaluations are either based on representative agent models or micro-econometric models for single 
individuals or married females conditional on husbands’ income, this study relies on models for both 
married couples and single individuals.  
 With respect to the traditional literature on optimal taxation, our contribution differs in two 
ways. First, while we share the same aim of identifying second-best tax-transfer rule, the social 
welfare function to be maximized is based on the EOp criterion instead of the EO criterion. Second, 
we solve the optimization problem computationally (i.e. by iteratively simulating a microeconometric 
model) rather than analytically. 3 
 In Section 2 we briefly discuss the justification and definition of the EOp-criterion and its 
relationship to more traditional concepts of social welfare, where the concern focuses upon the 
equality of outcome (EO) criterion rather than equality of opportunity. In the same section we also 
introduce and motivate the extended EOp criterion. 
 In Section 3.1 we use a micro-econometric model of household labour supply, estimated on 
1993 Italian data, to simulate the effects of various constant-revenue affine tax rules, i.e. the tax rules 
defined by a universal lump-sum transfer (positive or negative) and a constant marginal tax rate that 
                                                     
3 The computational approach to designing optimal taxes is also adopted in Aaberge and Colombino (2008). 
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produces the same revenue collected with the observed 1993 rule. These tax rules are evaluated and 
compared according to the extended EOp-criterion. Furthermore, the EOp-optimal tax rule is also 
identified. The model, the empirical specification, the data used and the estimates are illustrated in the 
Appendix. The main reason to perform the exercise with the affine tax rules is to make our results 
(obtained with a very detailed microeconometric model) comparable to those reported in Roemer et al. 
(2003) (obtained with a simple theoretical model and calibrated parameters). In fact, in Section 3.2 we 
perform a similar exercise as in Section 3.1, but looking at the class of tax-rules defined by a transfer 
and two tax rates (instead of one as for the affine rules). In Section 4 we compare the evaluation of tax 
rules according the EOp and EO criteria. Since it in many cases turn out that the optimal tax rule is a 
universal lump-sum tax, and since lump-sum taxes are typically judged hard to implement and to 
support politically, in Section 5 we provide optimal tax rules under the constraint that lump-sum taxes 
are not allowed.  Section 6 summarises the main results. The Appendix illustrates the 
microeconometric model, the dataset used, the estimates and the the 1993 tax rule. 
2. The EO and EOp criteria 
The standard approach in evaluating tax systems is to employ a social objective (welfare) function as 
the basic evaluating instrument. This function is commonly used to summarise the changes in (adult-
equivalent) incomes resulting from introducing various alternatives to the actual tax system in a 
country. The simplest way to summarise the changes that take place is to add up the income 
differentials, implying that individuals are given equal welfare weights independently of whether they 
are poor or rich. However, if besides total welfare we also care about the distributional consequences 
of a tax system, then an alternative to the linear additive welfare function is required. In this paper we 
rely on the class of rank-dependent social welfare functions that originates from Mehran (1976) and 
are defined by 
(2.1)  
1
1
0
( ) ( ) ,W p t F t dt−= 
where F-1 is the left inverse of the cumulative distribution function of (adult-equivalent) income F with 
mean μ and ( )p t  is a positive weight-function defined on the unit interval. As demonstrated by Yaari 
(1988) the social welfare functions (2.1) can be given a similar normative justification as is made for 
the “expected utility” social welfare functions introduced by Atkinson (1970).4.  
                                                     
4 Several other authors have discussed rationales for this approach, see e.g. Sen (1974), Hey and Lambert (1980), Donaldson 
and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1992) and Aaberge (2001). 
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  In this paper we use the following specification of ( )p t ,  
(2.2) ( )1
log , 1
( )
1 , 2,3,....
1
k k
t k
p t k t k
k
−
− =
= 
− =
−
 
Note that the inequality aversion exhibited by the social welfare function Wk  associated with  
decreases with increasing k. As  approaches inequality neutrality and coincides with the 
linear additive welfare function defined by 
( )kp t
kk , W→ ∞
(2.3) 
1
1
0
( ) .W F t dt μ−
∞
= =  
It follows by straightforward calculations that kW ≤ μ  for all j and that Wk is equal to the mean  μ for 
finite k if and only if F is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, Wk can be interpreted as the equally 
distributed (equivalent) level of equivalent income. As recognised by Yaari (1988) this property 
suggests that Ck, defined by  
(2.4) 1 , 1, 2,...kk
W
kC
μ
= − =  
can be used as a summary measure of inequality5. Moreover, as was recognized by Ebert (1987) the 
justification of the social welfare function  can be made in terms of value judgement of 
the trade-off between the mean and (in)equality in the distribution of income. For a given sum of 
incomes the welfare functions Wk take their maximum value when everyone receives the same income 
and may thus be interpreted as EO-criteria (equality of outcome) when employed as a measure for 
judging between tax systems.  
(1kW μ= − )kC
 Aaberge (2007) proves that the family of inequality measures { }kC : k 1,2,...=  and the mean 
μ  provide a complete characterization of the distribution function F. However, in applied work one 
has for practical reasons to restrict to a few measures of inequality. To this end, Aaberge (2007) draws 
on standard statistical practice to justify the use of C1 (the Bonferroni coefficient), C2 (the Gini 
coefficient) and C3 as a basis for summarizing the inequality information in an income distribution and 
the associated social welfare functions W1, W2 and W3 to assess the trade-off between efficiency and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
5 As demonstrated by Aaberge (2001) Ck – measures can also be axiomatically justified as criteria for ranking Lorenz curves. 
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(in)equality. Moreover, these three measures of inequality also prove to supplement each other with 
regard to sensitivity to transfers at the lower, the central and the upper part of the income distribution. 
To ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion profiles exhibited by W1, W2, W3 and W  Table 
2.1 displays ratios of the corresponding weights – as defined by (2.2) – of the median individual and 
the 1 per cent poorest, the 5 per cent poorest, the 30 per cent poorest and the 5 per cent richest 
individual for different social welfare criteria. As can be observed from the weight profiles provided 
by Table 2.1 W1 will be particular sensitive to changes in policies that affect the welfare of the poor. 
∞
W
 
Table 2.1 . Distributional weight profiles of four different social welfare functions  
 W1 
(Bonferroni) 
W2 
(Gini) 
W3 
∞
 
(Utilitarian) 
p(.01)/p(.5) 6.64 1.98 1,33 1 
p(.05)/p(.5) 4.32 1.90 1.33 1 
p(.30)/p(.5) 1.74 1.40 1.21 1 
p(.95)/p(.5) 0.07 0.10 0.13 1 
 
  As indicated by Roemer (1998) using social welfare functions based on equality of outcome 
is controversial and might suffer from the drawback of receiving little support among citizens6. This is 
due to the fact that differences in outcomes resulting from differences in efforts are, by many, 
considered ethically acceptable and thus should not be the target of a redistribution policy. An 
egalitarian redistribution policy should instead seek to equalise those income differentials arising from 
factors beyond the control of the individual. Thus, not only the outcome, but its origin and how it was 
obtained, matters. This is the essential idea behind Roemer’s (1998) theory of equality of opportunity, 
where people are supposed to differ with respect to circumstances, which are attributes of the 
environment of the individual that influence her earning potential, and which are “beyond her control”. 
Roemer’s theory has first and foremost been used as a basis for evaluating the impact of specific 
policies on distributions of income and education across types; see e.g. Roemer at al. (2003)7.   
 This study defines circumstances by family background (proxied by father’s education), and 
classifies the individuals into three types according to father's years of education:  
• less than 5 years (Type 1),  
                                                     
6 See also Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen (1989) and Roemer (1993).  
 
7 We refer to Peragine (2002, 2004), Bourguignon et al. (2003) and Checchi and Peragine (2009) for discussions on how to 
measure (in)equality of opportunity.  
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• 5-8 years (Type 2), and 
• more than 8 years (Type 3).  
 Let  denote the income level of the individual located at the tth quantile of the income 
distribution (Fj) of type j. The differences in incomes within each type are assumed to be due to 
different degrees of effort for which the individual is to be held responsible, whereas income 
differences that may be traced back to family background are considered to be beyond the control of 
the individual. As indicated by Roemer (1998) this suggests that we may measure a person’s effort by 
the quantile of the income distribution where he is located. Next, Roemer declares that two individuals 
of different type have expended the same degree of effort if they have identical position (rank) in the 
income distribution of their type; i.e. an individual of type i with income  and an individual of 
type j with income  are supposed to expend the same degree of effort, which means that an EOp 
welfare function should aim at reducing the difference between this incomes. Thus, an EOp (Equality 
of Opportunity) tax policy should aim at designing a tax system such that is maximised for 
each quantile t. However, since this criterion is rather demanding and in most cases will not produce a 
complete ordering of the tax systems under consideration a weaker ranking criterion is required. To 
this end Roemer (1998) proposes to employ as the social objective the average of the lowest income at 
each quantile, 
1
jF (t)
−
)t(F 1i
−
jmin F
−
1
jF (t)
−
1(t)
(2.7)  
1
1
0
min ( )jjW F t
−
∞
=  dt
Thus,  ignores income differences within the most disadvantaged group and is solely concerned 
about differences that arise from the observed differential circumstances. By contrast, the EO criteria 
defined by (2.1) does not distinguish between the different sources that contribute to income 
inequality. As an alternative to (2.1) and (2.7) we introduce the following family of extended EOp 
welfare functions, 
W
∞

(2.8)  
1
1
0
( )min ( ) , 1,2,...,k k jjW p t F t dt k
−
= =
where pk(t) is defined by (2.2). The essential difference between  and W  is that  gives 
increasing weight to lower quantiles in the income distribution of the most disadvantage group. Thus, 
in this respect  captures also an aspect of inequality within types.  
kW ∞ kW
kW
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 Our justification for introducing the extended EOp welfare functions is twofold. First, 
besides parents’ education (or other indicators one might have chosen), there might be other 
exogenous factors that affect individuals’ achievements. Thus, given the definition of types based on 
father’s education, differences in income within the most disadvantaged group might still be partly due 
to circumstances and partly be due to effort. The extended EOp welfare functions (2.8) accounts for 
the fact that part of the differences within the most disadvantaged group might still arise not from 
different levels of effort but rather from different circumstances. Second, the extended EOp welfare 
functions might be considered as a mixture of the pure EOp welfare function and the EO welfare 
functions. Thus, the extended EOp criterion provides a better basis for understanding differences in 
results produced by the pure EOp criterion and by the EO criteria. Note that the extended EOp welfare 
functions treat transfers from individuals that do not belong to the most disadvantage group to 
individuals that belong to the most disadvantage group as welfare improving. Moreover, transfers 
from richer to poorer individuals within the most disadvantage group is also welfare improving. 
  
 Note that 1min ( )ii F t
−  defines the inverse of the following cumulative distribution function 
( )F  
(2.9) iiF( x ) max F ( x )=
 . 
Thus, we may decompose the EOp welfare functions  as we did for the EOp welfare functions Wk. 
Accordingly, we have that 
kW
(2.10)  ( )1 , 1,2,...k kW W C k∞= − = 
where , defined by kC
(2.11) 1 , 1,2,kk
WC k
W
∞
= − =

 ...
welfare function that was introduced by Roemer (1998). Thus,  for  may
 
is a summary measure of inequality for the mixture distribution . F
 Expression (2.10) demonstrates that the extended EOp welfare functions  for  take 
into account value judgements about the trade-off between the mean income and the inequality in the 
distribution of income for the most (observed) EOp disadvantaged people. Thus,  may be 
considered as an inequality within the most disadvantaged group adjusted version of the pure EOp 
kW
kW
 be inter
k < ∞
preted as an kW k < ∞
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EOp welfare function that, in contrast to W
∞
 , gives increasing weight to dvantaged individuals 
who occupy low effort  quantiles. 
 Note that the EOp criterio
 disa
n wa ginally interpreted as more acceptable from the point of 
f 
ss 
 
e 
er 
gly, 
ion. 
e 
s ori
view of individualistic societies. Our extended EOp welfare functions are concerned about inequality 
between observable types as well as inequality within the (observable) worst-off distribution defined 
by (2.9) and can in that sense be considered to capture features from both the pure EOp welfare 
function and the EO welfare functions. EOp looks at what happens to the distribution formed by the 
most disadvantaged segments of the intersecting observable type-specific distributions (defined by 
2.9). Moreover, the pure version of the criterion only looks at the mean of the (observable) worst-of
distribution. By contrast, EO takes into account the whole income distribution. For a given sum of 
incomes, EO will consider equality of income (everyone receives the same income) as the most 
desirable income distribution. The pure EOp will instead consider equality in mean incomes acro
observable types as the ultimate goal. Since the extended EOp combines these two criteria, transfers
that increase the mean income of the worst-off group and/or reduce the income differentials between 
the individuals within the worst-off distribution are considered welfare improving by the extended 
EOp. Thus, in the case of a fixed total income also the extended EOp will consider equality of incom
as the most desirable distribution. However, by transferring money from the most advantaged type to 
the most disadvantaged type, EOp inequality may be reduced although transfers may be conflicting 
with the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, which states that an income transfer from a richer to a poor
person reduces overall income inequality, provided that the receiver does not become richer than the 
donor. Note that the EOp and the EO criteria coincide if and only if the various type distributions 
coincide. Moreover, we want to stress that while the pure EOp is a special case of our generalized 
EOp, the latter is not a special case of EO. The two criteria (EO and EOp) are not nested. Accordin
theoretical considerations cannot be used to clarify whether EOp or EO will favors the most inequality 
averse tax structure. This is simply an empirical question. Thus, whether it is more “efficient” to 
reduce inequality between types or within the worst-off distribution depends on the specific situat
When labour supply responses to taxation are taken into account the composition of observable types 
in the worst-off distribution will change and depend on the chosen welfare function as well as on the 
considered tax rule. Thus, the large heterogeneity in labour supply responses to tax changes that is 
captured by our model(s) makes it impossible to state anything on EOp- or EO-optimality before th
simulation exercises have been completed.  
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3. Optimal tax-transfer rules 
In what follows we determine – by microeconometric simulation – the income tax-transfer rules that 
solve problem (2.6) defined in the previous section. It is important to stress that the tax-transfer rules 
we consider are assumed to depend only on income (as much as current rules essentially do). In 
particular, they do not depend on the “type” (father’s education in this exercise) the individuals belong 
to. In other words, we aim at finding the tax-transfer rules that best conform to the EOp criterion 
within the class of rules that only depend on income. Despite the fact that “types” might be 
observable, we postulate that it is not practical or realistic or politically acceptable to actually use them 
as an argument of the tax-transfer rule. We take therefore a second-best perspective where only 
income can be used as an instrument. 
The optimal rules are determined computationally, i.e. we employ a microeconometric model that is 
capable of simulating choices (labour supply) of couples and singles facing alternative tax-transfer 
rules. Given a parametric representation of the tax-transfer rule, we iteratively search the parameter 
space until the social welfare function is maximized under the constraint of a constant total net tax 
revenue. The model is explained in detail in the Appendix. The sample used for the estimation and the 
simulation of the model is obtained from the Bank-of-Italy 1993 Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW 1993). It contains single females, single males, and couples that are between 19 and 54 
year old. To capture the heterogeneity in preferences we have estimated three separate models of 
labour supply: one for single females, one for single males and one for couples. The main features of 
the 1993 tax rule – i.e. the actual tax rules the households face – are briefly illustrated in the Appendix. 
 The tax reform simulations consist of five main steps: 
1. The tax rule is applied to individual earners’ gross incomes in order to obtain disposable incomes. 
New labour supply responses in view of a new tax rule are taken into account by the household 
labour supply models for singles and couples described in the Appendix. Note that the utility 
functions (and choice sets) of the underlying micro-econometric model(s) are stochastic. Thus, we 
use stochastic simulation to find, for each individual/couple, the optimal choice given a tax-
transfer rule. The simulations are made under the conditions of unchanging total tax revenue and 
non-negative disposable household incomes. 
2. To each decision making individual between 18 and 54 years old, an equivalent income is 
imputed, computed as total disposable household income divided by the square root of the number 
of household members.  
3. We then build the individual equivalent income distributions F1, F2 and F3 for the types defined 
according to parental (actually father’s) education: less than 5 years (type 1), 5-8 years (type 2) 
and more than 8 years (type 3). 
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4. Finally, we compute kW for k =1, 2, 3 and ∞ . 
5. Optimization is performed by iterating the above steps, in order to find the tax rule that produces 
the highest value of kW  for each value of k under the constraint of unchanged tax revenue, 
provided that the tax rule is a member of certain sets of two- and three-parameter tax rules. 
3.1. EOp-evaluation of alternative two-parameter tax rules 
The alternative two-parameter tax rules are of the following type:  
(1 )x c t y= + − ,  
where 
y = gross income,  
x = disposable income, 
c = lump-sum transfer (positive or negative), and 
t = constant marginal tax rate.  
This class of tax-transfer rule is the same as that considered in Roemer et al. (2003). Here however we 
use a more sophisticated empirical strategy. In Sections 3.2 and 5 we will consider 3-parameter tax-
transfer rules. 
Note that the income and tax figures below are measured in 1000 ITL since the model is estimated for 
a pre-EURO year (to get the EURO equivalent just divide the figures by 1.93627) . The results of the 
two-parameter tax reform simulations are summarised in Tables 1 and 2 and in Figure 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Optimal two-parameter tax systems under various EOp social objective criteria ( )  kW
k 1 2 3 ∞ 
marginal tax rate, t .774 .637 0 0 
lump-sum 
tax/transfer, c 
11,500 9,500 -5,790 -5,790 
 
Table 1 presents the EOp-optimal affine tax rules for different values of k, i.e. for different degrees of 
concern for within type inequality. Recall that the higher is k, the lower is the concern for within type 
inequality. 
 As demonstrated by Table 1 the optimal policy is very sensitive to the value of k. For , 
the EOp-optimal tax rule is the pure lump-sum tax (i.e.  and ) whereas for  the optimal 
tax rule consists of a very high marginal tax rate and a positive lump-sum transfer. An implication is 
3k ≥
0t = 0c < 2k ≤
11 
that the concern for the equality of opportunity by itself does not imply high marginal tax rates. Only 
if we also account for within type inequality, does the optimal policy entail high marginal tax rates. 
 In order to interpret correctly our results, it should be remembered that the lump-sum rule 
considered here is not the lump-sum rule envisaged in the 2nd Welfare Theorem, which would require 
individual (or household) – specific lump-sum taxes or transfers. In our exercise, the lump-sum rule 
envisages taxes or transfers equal for everyone.  
 
Figure 1. Distributions of observed equivalent income by type. 1000 ITL 
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Figure 2. Distributions of individual equivalent income by type under the EOp2(1) and EOp2(3) 
tax systems. 1000 ITL 
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Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 give more details. The graphs illustrate the equivalent income 
distributions under the actual 1993 tax rule (Figure 1) and under the EOp-optimal rules for k=1 and 
k≥3 (Figure 2). Table 2 reports the value of the EOp criterion for different tax rules. In particular, we 
focus on the comparison between the observed rule (1993), the pure flat tax (a theoretical benchmark), 
and the three linear rules that are EOp optimal under different values of k. In each column (i.e. for 
each k) the bold figure is the maximised value of the EOp criterion, i.e. it corresponds to the EOp-
optimal tax rule. EOp2(r) denotes the EOp-optimal affine tax rule when k = r. 
 
Table 2. EOp-performance (  of the 1993 tax system, a flat tax system and three different 
EOp-optimal two-parameter tax systems 
) kW
k  
 
 
Tax system 
Social objective 
function 
 ( )kW   
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
∞ 
1993 tax system  10,523 12,797 13,893 18,323 
Flat tax t .181c 0
=  
=   10,834 13,496 14,823 20,449 
EOp2 (1) t .774c 11,500
=  
=   12,661 13,652 14,077 15,641 
EOp2 (2) t .637c 9,500
=  
=   12,406 13,660 14,237 16,486 
EOp2 (3) t 0c 5,790
=  
= −   9,942 13,270 14,992 22,231 
 
Table 2 enables us to compare the EOp performance of the various rules for a given k (note that the 
comparison only makes sense between elements of the same column). We can see that although the 
flat tax is never EOp-optimal, for any value of k, it improves upon the observed 1993 rule. More 
generally, one can always find an affine tax rule that is EOp-preferred to the observed 1993 one. 
However, the direction along which one can find EOp-optimal tax rules depends crucially on the value 
of k. If  one has to move towards very high marginal tax rates (coupled with high transfers). If k 
is greater than 1, then the EOp-optimal tax rules require lower marginal tax rates – and more revenue 
collected through the lump-sum part of the tax. These aspects are further illustrated by Figure 3, where 
we draw the curve – in the (c, t) plane – of the revenue-constant affine tax rules, and for any k we 
indicate the sets of tax rules with a lower or with a higher EOp performance with respect to the 
observed rule. As k increases the graphs in Figure 3 demonstrate that the more we reduce the marginal 
tax rate − and the more revenue we collect through lump-sum taxation − the better is the EOp-
performance. 
1k =
 The fact that the optimal tax rule is the pure lump-sum tax, provided that we do not put too 
much weight on within type inequality, is a somewhat striking result in itself. After all, EOp is an 
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egalitarian criterion, and one would expect it to favour higher marginal tax rates. How can we explain 
this apparently counter-intuitive result? A possible explanation lies with the relatively high labour 
supply response of the least advantaged individuals. Since the EOp-criterion requires the maximisation 
of a weighted average of the incomes of the least advantaged type, and since the labour supply of these 
individuals turns out to be very responsive to higher net wage rates, it follows that lower marginal tax 
rates (or, in the limit, a marginal tax rate equal to 0) can in fact improve substantially the welfare of 
this group. However, this effect may be counterbalanced if we give enough weight (low value of k) to 
low effort individuals. Table 4 gives some support to this argument by illustrating the labour supply 
response of the different types when facing alternative tax rules. When the pure lump-sum tax is 
applied, the labour supply (and therefore the available income) of type 1 (the most disadvantaged 
group) increases much more (as percentage variation) than labour supply of types 2 or 3.8 
 The different population considered and the heterogeneity of the labour supply elasticity 
most likely also play a crucial role in explaining the differences between our results and those obtained 
by Roemer et al. (2003), where only males are considered and a fixed value of the labour supply 
elasticity is set equal to 0.06. The social welfare criterion corresponding to the one adopted in Roemer 
et al. (2003) is W . For this social welfare function, we get that the optimal rule is a pure lump-sum 
tax = 5790 (tax rate = 0). Roemer et al. (2003) obtain instead an optimal tax rate that varies from .65 to 
.83 and an optimal (positive) lump-sum transfer that varies from 16630 to 21300. In order to get 
optimal rules that are close to those of Roemer et al. (2003) we should use , i.e. the social welfare 
function corresponding to the Bonferroni version of the generalized version of the EOp crierion.   
∞

1W
 Overall it seems that the heterogeneity of labour supply behaviour plays a crucial role in 
shaping the optimal tax rules for a given social welfare function: this gives support to the use of 
microeconometric simulation tools for investigating optimal taxation issues. 
 
                                                     
8 To be sure, a bias in favour of the lump-sum tax might be due to the fact that we equate income and welfare. When 
accounting for the value of leisure (object of on-going research), the policy prescriptions might change.    
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Table 3. Decomposition of EOp social welfare (  under the 1993 tax system, a flat tax system 
and various EOp-optimal two-parameter tax systems 
) kW
Measure of inequality 
Tax system W
∞
  
1C  2C  3C  
1993 tax system 18,323 .426 .302 .242 
Flat tax    t .181c 0
=  
=  20,449 .470 .340 .275 
EOp2 (1)   t .774c 11,500
=  
=  15,642 .191 .127 .100 
EOp2 (2)   t .637c 9,500
=  
=  16,486 .247 .171 .136 
EOp2 (3)   t 0c 5,790
=  
= −  22,231 .553 .403 .326 
 
Figure 3. Sets of revenue constant affine tax systems under different EOp welfare criteria ( ) kW  
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Table 4. Labour supply by types under different tax systems*  
Type 
Tax system All 
1 2 3 
1993 tax system 1383 1279 1383 1469 
Flat tax    t .181c 0
=  
=  1391 (+0.58) 1369 (+7.04) 1362 (+1.52) 1471 (+0.14) 
EOp2 (1)   t .774c 11,500
=
=
 1095 (-20.82) 1109 (-13.29) 1087 (-21.40) 1100 (-25.12) 
EOp2 (2)   t .637c 9,500
=  
=  1160 (-16.12) 1142 (-10.71) 1148 (-16.99) 1200 (-18.31) 
EOp2 (3)   t 0c 5,790
=
= −
 1487 (+7.52) 1450 (+13.37) 1459 (+5.50) 1578 (+7.42) 
*Percentage changes relative to the labour supply under the 1993 tax system in parentheses. 
 
 
What happens to specific groups of people under the EOp-optimal rules and in particular under the 
pure lump-sum policy? Table 5 presents, for various sub-samples, their composition in terms of EOp-
types, the average net observed income in 1993, and the change in average income when the lump-
sum rule is applied. The results in Table 5 give a more vivid understanding of the effects of the 
“reform” from the viewpoints of efficiency and equality. All the sub-samples on average gain in the 
sense that they get more income. If we look at the gains across types, we see that types 2 or 3 almost 
always gain proportionately more than type 1. However this is not relevant from the point of view of 
the EOp criterion, according to which we only care about what happens to the worst-off type for each 
quantile (in our case, in practice, this is type 1). Under the lump-sum rule, type 1 gains more than 
under the alternative rules; it does not matter if type 2 and 3 gain even more. Where do these gains 
come from? Clearly there are two (interdependent) channels, higher net wages (in fact an agent gets 
the whole gross wage under the lump-sum rule) and higher labour supply. The labour supply response 
is documented in Table 4. For example, we can compute from Table 5 that overall average income 
increases by 54 per cent gross of the lump-sum tax of 5,790,000 ITL. Since the overall increase in 
labour supply amounts to 7.5 per cent (from Table 4), we have a 46.5 per cent gain attributable to the 
increase in net wage and to the interaction between wage and labour supply across the sample. We 
have seen that the lump-sum rule is outcome disequalizing (Table 3). However we know that the 
generalised EOp index is only affected by the inequality among the individuals belonging to the worst-
off type. If we look at what is going on more generally in the whole sample, the effect upon 
distribution is less clear-cut. For example, the relative gain of the poor is larger than the relative gain 
of the non-poor.  
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Table 5. Relative proportions, mean observed individual (disposable equivalent) income  
and changes in mean individual income  by gender, family status, economic status 
(poverty) and family background (type) when the tax regime is changed to lump-sum taxation. 
In 1000 LIT 
( )obsW
( − obsW W∞ )
  Household type (by family background) 
Individual and 
household 
characteristics 
  
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
All 
Proportion (per cent) 20.3 54.7 25.0 100 
Mean income 21,107 22,831 29,312 23,540 
 
All 
Changes in mean 
income 
 
3,907 
 
5,794 
 
12,011 
 
6,969 
Proportion (per cent) 19.9 51.7 28.4 100 
Mean income 22,369 28,480 34,046 28,843 
 
Single males 
Changes in mean 
income 
 
3,210 
 
7,013 
 
7,343 
6,350 
Proportion (per cent) 15.8 51.7 32.6 100 
Mean income 18,076 20,110 26,085 21,734 
 
Single females 
Changes in mean 
income 
 
3,134 
 
2,568 
 
4,412 
 
3,258 
Proportion (per cent) 15.3 51.2 33.5 100 
Mean income 24,377 28,613 33,913 29,741 
 
Two person households 
Changes in mean 
income 
 
7,153 
 
9,781 
 
14,909 
 
11,097 
Proportion (per cent) 16.5 55.0 28.5 100 
Mean income 20,091 24,795 29,050 25,235 
 
Three person 
households 
Changes in mean 
income 
 
4,678 
 
5,066 
 
14,333 
 
7,648 
Proportion (per cent) 23.5 55.8 20.7 100 
Mean income 16,848 20,516 27,349 21,064 
 
Households with more 
than three persons 
Changes in mean 
income 
 
3,022 
 
5,153 
 
9,785 
 
5,608 
Proportion (per cent) 39.2 50.4 10.4 100 
Mean income 7,235 7,720 7,424 7,500 
 
Poor individuals 
Changes in mean 
income 
 
5,276 
 
7,487 
 
13,174 
 
7,216 
Proportion (per cent) 18.0 55.2 26.8 100 
Mean income 21,320 24,541 30,368 25,528 
 
Non-poor individuals 
Changes in mean 
income 
 
3,537 
 
5,603 
 
11,955 
 
6,939 
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3.2. EOp-evaluation of alternative three-parameter tax rules 
One might suspect that the results – in particular the EOp-optimality of a pure lump-sum tax for k = 3 
or greater – are somewhat forced by the fact that we restrict the simulation to a two-dimensional class 
of tax rules. Since the disadvantaged individuals are more responsive – in terms of labour supply – 
than the rich and/or advantaged individuals, we should be able to improve upon the pure lump-sum tax 
or upon the high marginal rate rules, by adopting a two-dimensional tax rule. Here we explore this 
policy direction. The class of tax rules considered is defined as follows: 
 
 1
1 2
(1 )   if  
(1 ) (1 )( )  if  
c t y y y
x
c t y t y y y
+ − ≤
= 
+ − + − − > y
 
 
where  
x = disposable income,  
y = gross income,  
y = average individual gross income in Italy on the survey year (1993).  
 Clearly one could consider more general and flexible rules. 9 Here, however, our aim is not 
the design of a realistic optimal system but rather the use of a stylized and easy-to-visualize class of 
tax-transfer rules as a basis for comparing the implications of different evaluation criteria. On the other 
hand, even a rule with two brackets is not devoid of realism since the recent trend for tax reform move 
in the direction of simplifying the rules and reducing the number of brackets. 
 Table 6 reports the optimal three-parameter rules for different values of k. For example, for 
k=1 the optimal rule is defined by a transfer c = 12,500, a first marginal tax rate  = 0.856 and a 
second marginal tax rate = 0.776. By comparing Table 6 with Table 1, we see that the EOp-optimal 
rules differ significantly depending on whether one considers a two-parameter (Table 1) or a three-
parameter rule (Table 6). When k = 1, the three-parameter EOp-optimal rule gives two very high and 
slightly regressive tax rates
1t
≥
2t
10 complemented by a large positive transfer, inducing a net-vs-gross 
income profile close to the ones implied by the Negative Income Tax schemes. The most marked 
differences with respect to the two-parameter case are found when using the k = 2. While the two-
parameter case called for tax rate over 60 per cent combined with a positive transfer of 9,500,000 ITL, 
the three-parameter case entails two very different tax rates with a marked progressive structure (from 
25 per cent to 53 per cent) and a much lower transfer (3,500,000 ITL). For any k , the two-3
                                                     
9 See for example Aaberge and Colombino (2008). 
10 Regressive in the sense that the marginal tax rate decreases with income. 
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parameter case chooses the pure lump-sum tax as the EOp-optimal policy. When we use a three-
parameter rule, with k = 3, we still have a positive tax rate (17 per cent) for the higher incomes, 
combined with a 3,500,000 ITL lump-sum tax. However, when we employ the pure EOp-welfare 
function (k = ∞), we are back to the EOp-optimality of the pure lump-sum tax. 
 It is worth mentioning that when the EOp-version of the Gini welfare function is adopted, 
the optimal tax rule is close to the actual one if not for the important difference of prescribing a 
universal lump-sum positive transfer of 3,500,000 ITL, which has no comparable counterpart in the 
actual system.  
 Table 7 is the analogue of Table 3 for the three-parameter rule. It shows the decomposition 
of the EOp social welfare function for different values of k and different tax rules, that is, the current 
1993 rule and the four EOp-optimal rules of Table 6, with EOp3(r) denoting the EOp-optimal three-
parameter tax rule when k = r.  
 Table 7 also provides an illustration of the equity-efficiency trade-off. The lump-sum rule 
(i.e. EOp3(∞)) is the most efficient one (measuring efficiency with W  ). If we adopt an egalitarian 
criterion, e.g. the Gini version of the EOp criterion, the optimal rule is EOp3(2). We have a loss of 
efficiency equal to 22,231 – 18,508. However the loss of efficiency is more than compensated by a 
gain in equality: indeed, the Gini coefficient decreases from .403 to .253 and the Gini EOp welfare 
function increases from 22,231(1-0.403) = 13,271 to 18,508(1-0.253) = 13,825. 
∞

 
 
Table 6. Optimal three-parameter tax systems under various EOp social objective criteria ( ) kW  
k 1 2 3 ∞ 
t1 .856 .251 0 0 
t2 .776 .531 .168 0 
c 12,500 3,500 -3,500 -5,790 
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Table 7. Decomposition of EOp social welfare (  under various three-parameter tax systems ) kW
Measure of inequality 
Tax system W
∞
  
1C  2C  3C  
1993 tax system 18,323 .426 .302 .242 
EOp3 (1)  
1
2
t .856
t .776
c 12,500
=  
=  
= 
15,393 .176 .116 .091 
EOp3 (2)  
1
2
t .251
t .531
c 3,500
=  
=  
= 
18,508 .364 .253 .201 
EOp3 (3)  
1
2
t 0
t .168
c 3,500
=  
=  
= − 
21,156 .497 .355 .285 
EOp3 (∞)  1 2t t 0c 5,790
= =  
= −  22,231 .553 .403 .326 
 
4. Comparison of empirical results based on EOp and EO criteria 
In this section we focus upon the evaluation of the EOp-optimal policies (illustrated in Section 3) 
using the more traditional evaluation criterion of equality of outcome (EO criterion, see Section 2). 
Table 8 reports the EO-performance, that is, the level of the EO social welfare function (defined in 
Section 2) of five policies discussed above for various values of k. The policies are the observed 1993 
tax rule, and the four EOp-optimal three-parameter rules for . The Table shows the 
decomposition of the EO-criterion into the efficiency and the inequality terms. More generally, we 
have also searched for the EO-optimal rule within the whole classes of the two-parameter and three-
parameter tax rules, and it always turns out that a universal lump-sum tax is optimal whatever the 
value of k. Thus, if we do not explicitly account for inequality between types according to the EOp 
criterion, the optimal policy always consists in a zero marginal tax rate coupled with a positive 
universal lump-sum tax, whatever the degree of inequality aversion. Table 8 clarifies that this result is 
due to very large efficiency effects of the lump-tax rule, large enough to over-compensate the also 
large inequality effects.  
1,2,3 and k = ∞
 It might appear paradoxical that, overall, EOp requires more redistribution (through marginal 
tax rates) than EO. However the paradox is only apparent. EOp is motivated by a methodological 
position that focuses on inequality due to circumstances: but this position does not necessarily imply 
less redistribution – a consequence of EO and EOp being non-nested criteria. 
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 Table 8 can also be read from the perspective of the efficiency-equity trade-off, as we did 
when commenting Table 7 at the end of Section 3.2 – but this time adopting the EO criterion. The EO-
most efficient policy is a lump-sum tax = 5,790 (i.e. EOp3 (∞)). This policy entails a mean income = 
30,510. However it also implies a high level of inequality, measured for example by the Gini 
coefficient (  ) = .402. Let us consider a more egalitarian policy, such as EOp3(2). This policy 
reduces the  to .255, however it also brings about a loss of efficiency equal to 10,033 = 30,510 – 
21,477.  
2C
2C
  
Table 8. Decomposition of the EO social welfare (  with respect to mean and income 
inequality under different tax systems 
)kW
Measure of inequality 
Tax system Mean income 
1C  2C  3C  
1993 tax system 23,540 .416 .295 .237 
EOp3 (1)  
1
2
t .856
t .776
c 12,500
=  
=  
= 
16,560 .193 .130 .104 
EOp3 (2)  
1
2
t .251
t .531
c 3,500
=  
=  
= 
21,477 .364 .255 .203 
EOp3 (3)  
1
2
t 0
t .168
c 3,500
=  
=  
= − 
27,573 .499 .363 .294 
EOp3 (∞)  1 2t t 0c 5,790
= =  
= −  30,510 .544 .402 .327 
 
 
5. Optimal rules when a universal lump-sum tax is not feasible 
As we have seen in previous sections, in many cases it turns out that the socially optimal tax rule is a 
universal lump-sum tax. Notice that this lump-sum tax  is identical for everyone  and is not to be 
confused with the policy of individualized lump-sum taxes that would be optimal in a first-best world. 
However, even a universal lump-sum tax might be not feasible, for example because it might be 
judged as not politically acceptable.. Therefore we also computed optimal tax rules where lump-sum 
positive transfers are allowed but not lump-sum taxes. The results are summarised in Tables 9 and 10 
respectively for the EOp and the EO criterion.  As it is the case with the policies computed in the 
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previous sections, the optimal no-lump-sum policies are the same under EOp and under EO when k = 
∞, with no transfers, a 31.3% marginal tax rate on the first segment and a 0% marginal tax rate on the 
second segment. This same rule remains the best one under EO for k = 3 and k = 2. For the same 
values of k, the EOp criterion prescribes instead a progressive rules (for k = 2, it also requires a 
positive transfer). For k =1 the two criteria diverge again: EOp prescribes a very large transfer 
together with very high (slightly regressive) marginal rates, while EO prescribes a modest transfer and 
much lower (regressive) marginal rates. Overall, as was also the case with the policies admitting lump-
sum taxes, the EOp criterion seems to require more redistribution than the EO criterion.    
 
Table 9. Optimal three-parameter tax systems under various EOp social objective criteria  
Lump-sum taxes not feasible  
( ) kW .
k 1 2 3 ∞ 
t1 .856 .251 0.106 .313 
t2 .776 .531 0.346 0 
c 12,500 3,500 0 0 
 
Table 10. Optimal three-parameter tax systems under various EO social objective criteria ( )   
Lump-sum taxes not feasible  

kW .
k 1 2 3 ∞ 
t1 .298 .313 .313 .313 
t2 .178 0 0 0 
c 2000 0 0 0 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have used a micro-econometric model of household labour supply in Italy in order to simulate and 
identify optimal (second-best)  income tax-transfer rules within classes of two- and three-parameter 
rules according to the criterion of Equality of Opportunity as developed by Roemer (1998). We have 
also offered an extended version of the EOp criterion that permits us to complement the pure EOp 
criterion with a variable degree of aversion to inequality within the worst-off distribution. When we 
admit the feasibility of  universal (i.e. not individual-specific) lump-sum taxes, the optimal tax rule 
turns out to be in fact a universal lump-sum tax, under the pure EOp criterion or under the extended 
EOp with moderate degrees of aversion to inequality (k = 3) within the worst-off distribution. The 
result seems to depend on a relatively high labour supply response from the most disadvantaged type: 
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the labour supply incentives – and the efficiency effects for the most disadvantaged – generated by the 
pure lump-sum tax are large enough to overcome the disequalizing effects of lump-sum taxation. A 
high degree of inequality aversion (k less than 3) instead produces EOp-optimal rules with strictly 
positive marginal tax rates. It is worth mentioning that when the EOp-version of the Gini welfare 
function is adopted, the optimal tax rule is close to the actual one if not for the important difference of 
prescribing a universal lump-sum positive transfer of 3,500,000 ITL (= 1807 Euros), which has no 
comparable counterpart in the actual system.  
 On the other hand, when using the equality of outcome (EO) criterion, the universal lump-
sum tax always turns out to be optimal, at least with respect to the classes of two- and three-parameter 
rules. Overall, the results do not conform to the perhaps common expectation that the EO criterion is 
more supportive of “interventionist” (redistributive) policies than an EOp approach. On the contrary, 
our data and our model indicate that EO never calls for redistribution, and only if an extended EOp 
criterion is introduced may redistributive intervention (through increasing marginal tax rates and/or 
positive transfers) be optimal depending on the degree of social aversion to inequality.11  
 We also identified the optimal rules when assuming that only universal lump-sum positive 
transfers (not taxes) are feasible. In this case the pure EOp-criterion and utilitarian EO-criterion dictate 
the same rule, namely a regressive system where all the taxes are collected form incomes in the first 
bracket. This same rule remains the optimal one under the EO-criterion except in the Bonferroni case 
(k = 1). The optimal rules become definitely more redistributive when adopting the extended EOp-
criterion. In particular, in the Gini case (k = 2) the optimal rule is close enough to the actual one, with 
the important difference that the optimal rule envisages a lump-sum transfer of approximately 1807 
Euros.   
 Looking at the results from a methodological perspective, the importance of heterogeneous 
labour supply responses in shaping the optimal tax rules suggest that simulation based on 
micorconometric models is a useful tool for investigating optimal taxation issues. 
                                                     
11 The policy prescription might change if we included the value of leisure in the measurement of individual 
welfare. For example, since under the pure lump-sum tax people work (and earn) a lot more, it might be the case 
that, when account is taken of their reduced leisure, the lump-sum tax is not so desirable. Including the value of 
leisure will be pursued in future work. 
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 Appendix  
A.1. The microeconometric model  
The modelling approach of this paper differs from the traditional textbook labour supply model since 
we treat  the utility function as a random variable and model labour supply decision as a random utility 
maximization problem. This framework can be considered as an extension of the standard multinomial 
logit model (see Dagsvik (1994) and Aaberge et al. (1999) for further details). For the sake of 
completeness we give a brief outline of this modelling framework. The agents choose among jobs, 
each job being defined by a wage rate w, hours of work h and other characteristics j. For expository 
simplicity we consider in what follows a single person household, although the model we estimate 
considers both singles and couples. The problem solved by the agent looks like the following: 
(A.1) ( ) ( ), ,max , ,x h j BU x h j∈  
under the budget constraint ( , ) ,x f wh m=  where 
 
h = hours of work 
w = gross wage rate 
j = other job and/or household characteristics 
m = gross exogenous income 
x = disposable income 
f(.,.) = tax rule that transforms gross incomes (wh,m) into net income x. 
 
The set B is the opportunity set, i.e. it contains all the opportunities available to the household. For 
generality we also include non-market opportunities into B; a non-market opportunity is a “job” with 
 and . Agents can differ not only in their preferences and in their wage (as in the 
traditional model) but also in the number of available jobs of different type. Note that for the same 
agent, wage rates (unlike in the traditional model) can differ from job to job. As analysts we do not 
know exactly what opportunities are contained in B. Therefore we use a probability density function to 
represent B. Let us denote by
w 0= h 0=
( , )p h w the opportunity density, i.e. the density of jobs of type ( ,  By 
specifying a probability density function on B we can for example allow for the fact that jobs with 
hours of work in a certain range are more or less likely to be found, possibly depending on agents’ 
characteristics; or for the fact that for different agents the relative number of market opportunities may 
).h w
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differ. From expression (A.1) it is clear that what we adopt is a choice model; choice, however, is 
constrained by the number and the characteristics of jobs in the opportunity set. Therefore the model is 
also compatible with the case of involuntary unemployment, i.e. an opportunity set that does not 
contain any market opportunity. Besides this extreme case, the number and the characteristics of 
market (and non-market) opportunities in general vary from individual to individual. Even if the set of 
market opportunities is not empty, in some cases it might contain very few elements and/or elements 
with bad characteristics. 
 We assume that the utility function can be factorized as 
(A.2)  ( ( , ), , ) ( ( , ) ( , , )U f wh m h j v f wh m h w jε=
where v and ε are the systematic and the stochastic component respectively, and ε  is i.i.d. according 
to: 
(A.3)  ( ) ( )1Pr expu uε −≤ = −
The term ε is a random taste-shifter which accounts for the effect on utility of all the characteristics of 
the household-job match which are observed by the household but not by us. We observe the chosen h 
and w. Therefore we can specify the probability that the agent chooses a job with observed 
characteristics (h, w). It can be shown that under the assumptions (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) we can write 
the probability density function of a choice (h,w) as follows12: 
(A.4) 
( ( , ), ) ( , )( , )
( ( , ), ) ( , )
v f wh I h p h wh w
v f xy I y p y x dxdy
ϕ =
 
 
Expression (A.4) is analogous to the continuous multinomial logit developed in the transportation and 
location analysis literature. The intuition behind expression (A.4) is that the probability of a choice  
(h, w) can be expressed as the relative attractiveness – weighted by a measure of “availability” p(h,w) 
– of jobs of type (h, w). More details on the derivation of (A.4) can be found in Aaberge et al. (1999). 
 From (A.4) we also see that this approach does not suffer from the complexity of the tax rule 
f. The tax rule, however complex, enters the expression as it is, and there is no need to simplify it in 
order to make it differentiable or manageable as in the traditional approach. The crucial difference is 
that in the traditional approach the functions representing household behaviour are derived on the basis 
                                                     
12 For the derivation of the choice density (A.4), see Aaberge et al. (1999).. 
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of a comparison of marginal variations of utility, while in the approach that we follow a comparison of 
levels of utility is directly involved. 
In order to estimate the model we choose convenient but still flexible parametric forms for V and 
p(h,w). The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. The likelihood function is the product 
of the choice densities (A.4) for every household in the sample.  
 
A.2. The Data  
   
The estimation and the simulation of the model is based on data from the 1993 Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW93). This survey is conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy and, 
besides household and individual socio-demographic characteristics, contains detailed information on 
labour, income and wealth of each household component. We use the 1993 survey since it is the only 
one containing information on family background. This information is necessary in order to perform 
the evaluation of alternative tax-transfer rules according to the EOP criterion. 
 The sample that we select contains 4827 individuals (2160 couples, 310 single females and 
206 single males). Singles and couples with income from self-employment are excluded from the 
sample: this is because their decision process may be substantially different from wage employees’ 
and typically involves a permanent element of uncertainty.  
 We have restricted the ages of the individuals to be between 19 and 54 in order to minimize 
the inclusion in the sample of individuals who in principle are eligible for retirement, since the current 
version of the model does not take the retirement decision into account. 
 Due to the above selection rules, the estimates and the simulations should be interpreted as 
conditional upon the decisions not to be self-employed and not to retire. 
 The labour incomes measured by the survey are net of social security contributions and of 
taxes on personal income. Therefore, in order to compute gross incomes we have to apply the 
“inverse” tax code. In turn, the “direct” tax code has to be applied to every point in each household’s 
choice set to compute disposable income associated with that point. Hourly wage rates are obtained by 
dividing gross annual wage income by observed hours.  
 Table A.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the microeconometric 
model. Other statistics on labour supply, incomes and taxes are reported in Table A.2. 
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 Table A.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the microeconometric model. Italy 1993. 
  Female Male 
Family status Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A 40.90 8.74 19 54 38.86 9.39 21 54 
S 9.73 4.21 0 19 10.47 4.09 0 19 
CU6 0.03 0.18 0 1 0 0 0 0 
CO6 0.17 0.49 0 4 0.03 0.22 0 2 
N 2.25 1.13 1 13 1.99 1.08 1 6 
w 12.14 12.18 0 144.35 14.03 8.76 0 144.79
Single  
h 1351.57 857.80 0 3328 1737.33 782.38 0 3640 
          
A 38.13 7.62 19 54 41.33 7.47 22 54 
S 9.45 4.13 0 19 9.76 3.96 0 19 
CU6 0.34 0.58 0 3 CU6 0.34 0.58 0 
CO6 0.58 0.73 0 3 CO6 0.58 0.73 0 
N 3.78 1.04 2 9 3.78 1.04 2 9 
w 7.28 10.01 0 111.07 16.43 9.91 0 121.09
 
 
 
Couples 
h 741.95 893.13 0 3640 1990.26 506.66 0 3640 
Note: A = age, S = years of education, CU6 = number of children of age < 6, CO6 = number of 
children of age >= 6, w = hourly wage rate (1000 ITL 1993), h = annual hours of work. 
 
Table A.2. Observed participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, taxes and deciles of 
household disposable income for single females, single males and couples. Italy 1993. 
 Annual hours Household income, 1000 ITL 1993  
Family 
status 
 
Participation 
rates  
(Per cent) Given 
participation
In the total 
population 
Gross income Taxes Disposable 
income 
  F M F M F M F M F M F M 
I 28 64 623 1496 168 966 4723 12307 310 1455 4413 10852
II 62 85 1270 1811 784 1540 12263 21248 946 3275 11318 17972
III 84 90 1717 1945 1442 1758 33159 43570 5374 8097 27785 35474
IV 93 92 1847 2070 1711 1893 62437 75630 12820 16520 49617 59110
V 88 95 1891 2124 1663 2014 96571 106137 21514 23859 75057 82279
 
 
Singles  
VI 77 88 1676 1932 1298 1695 37480 47707 6779 9376 30702 38331
I 14 96 1030 1571 145 1501 15221 525  14695
II 20 98 1209 1832 241 1787 24372 2109  22263
III 44 99 1546 1991 677 1970 48187 8960  39227
IV 66 99 1731 2117 1133 2103 85135 19983  65152
V 74 99 1828 2237 1361 2225 128396 34365  94032
 
 
 
Couples 
VI 44 98 1590 1972 694 1943 54225 11074  43150
Note: I = first decile; II = second decile; III = third to eighth deciles; IV = ninth decile; V = tenth 
decile; VI = whole sample.  
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Table A.3 shows the marginal tax schedule applied to personal incomes in 1993. The unit of taxation 
is the individual.  
 
Table A.3. Marginal tax rates applied to personal incomes. Italy 1993. 
Income (1000 LIT) Marginal tax rate (per cent) 
Up to 7,200 10 
7,200 - 14,400 22 
14,400 – 30,000 27 
30,000 – 60,000 34 
60,000 – 150,000 41 
150,000 – 300,000 46 
Over 300,000 51 
 
Some expenditures (such as medical or insurance) can be deducted from income before applying 
taxes. Child allowances and dependent spouse allowances – up to the amount of the gross tax – can be 
subtracted from the tax. Conditional on the number of household members and household total 
income, the head of the household may receive family benefits. 
 
A.3. Empirical specification 
 To account for the fact that single individuals and married couples may face different choice 
sets and exhibit different preferences over income and leisure we estimate separate models for single 
females and males and married couples. Hereafter we explain the empirical specification chosen for 
the utility functions and the opportunity density functions. Tables A.4 and A.5 will present the 
Maximum Likelihood parameter estimates. Table A.6 will illustrate the wage elasticities of labour 
supply implied by the estimates and obtained by microsimulation. 
 
A.3.1. Singles 
The structural part of the utility functions for single females and males is assumed to be of the 
following form 
(A.5)  ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 422 3 5 6 7 8 9
1 4
( , ) 1 1
log ( , ), log log 6 6
f wh I L
v f wh I h N A A CU CO
α α
α α α α α α α
α α
− −
= + + + + + +
      

)
 
where ( ,f wh I  is disposable income (income after tax) measured in 107 JTL, N is the size of the 
household, A is age, CU6 and CO6 are number of children below and above 6 years old and L is the 
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proportion of leisure time relative to total available time, i.e. (1 8736L h= − )
0
. Note that the children 
terms are dropped in the utility function for single males. 
 We assume that the density of pairs of offered hours and wages in the market is given by 
(A.6)  ( ) 0 1 2
0
( ) ( ) if 0
,
1 if
p g h g w h
p h w
p h
>
= 
− =
where 0p  is the proportion of market opportunities in the opportunity set, and g1 and g2 are the 
densities of hours and wages, respectively. Hours is assumed to be uniformly distributed except for a 
possible peak in the full-time job interval <1846,2106>. Thus, g1 is given by 
(A.7) 
[ ]
[ ]
1
if 52,1846
( ) if 1846, 2106
if 2106,3640
h
g h h
h
γ
γπ
γ
 ∈
=  ∈ ∈
 
where 3640 is the maximum hours observed in the sample and 
(A.8) 1
3380 260
γ
π
=
+
. 
The proportion of market opportunities ( )0p  is assumed to depend on whether one lives in northern or 
southern Italy, 
(A.9) ( )0 0 1
1
1 exp
p
Rμ μ
=
+ − −
 
where 1=R  if the individual is living in North-Italy. Thus, a positive value for μ1 means that living in 
North-Italy increases the proportion of market opportunities in the opportunity set. 
 The density of offered wages is assumed to be lognormal with mean that depends on length 
of schooling (S) and on past potential working experience (E), where experience is defined to be equal 
to age minus length of schooling minus five, 
(A.10) 20 1 2 3log w S E Eβ β β β η= + + + +  
where η is standard normally distributed. 
 
Given the above assumption upon the stochastic component and upon the density of opportunities, it 
turns out that the probability (density) that an opportunity ( is chosen is ),h w
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 (A.11) 
( ( , ), ) ( , )( , )
( ( , ), ) ( , )
v f wh I h p h wh w
v f xy I y p y x dxdy
ϕ =
 
  
In view of the empirical specification it is convenient to divide both numerator and denominator by 
01 p−  and define (00
0
exp
1
pg
p
μ μ= = +
−
)0 1R . We can then rewrite the choice density as follows: 
 
(A.12)  0 1 2
0 1 2
0 0
( ( , ), ) ( ) ( )( , )
( (0, ),0) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( )
x y
v f wh I h g g h g wh w
v f I v f xy I y g g y g x dxdy
ϕ
> >
=
+  
  
  
for { },h w > 0  and 
(A.13) 
0 1 2
0 0
( (0, ),0)(0,0)
( (0, ),0) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( )
x y
v f I
v f I v f xy I y g g y g x dxdy
ϕ
> >
=
+  
   
for { }, 0h w = . 
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Table A.4. Estimates of the parameters of the utility functions and the opportunity densities for 
single females and males*). Italy 1993 
Variable Coefficient Single females Single males 
Preferences:    
Consumption α1 0.347  (0.163) 0.274  (0.208) 
 α2 0.951  (0.248) 1.268  (0.359) 
 α3 -0.232  (0.087) -0.048  (0.165) 
Leisure α4 -14.401  (6.778) -12.185  (4.391) 
 α5 7.377 (11.020) 0.622  (5.112) 
 α6 -3.925  (5.904) -0.251  (2.754) 
 α7 0.527  (0.800) 0.027  (0.375) 
 α8 0.185  (0.314)   
 α9 -0.022  (0.044)   
Opportunities: 
 
   
Market opportunities μ0 -0.697  (0.268) -2.063  (0.408) 
 μ1  0.207  (0.295) 0.360  (0.476) 
Hours density (peak) π 10.990  (4.299) 17.993  (7.718) 
Wage density β0 1-012  (0.194) 0.987  (0.184) 
 β1 0.092  (0.009) 0.081  (0.009) 
 β2 0.029  (0.013) 0.041  (0.012) 
 β3 -0.253 ⋅ 10-3 (0.266 ⋅ 10-3 -0.425 ⋅ 10-3 (0.248 ⋅ 10-3 
 σ2 0.423  (0,018) 0.385  (0.021) 
*) Standard deviations in parentheses. 
31 
4.3.2. Married couples 
The labour supply model for married couples accounts for both spouses’ decisions through the 
following specification of the structural part of the utility function for couples: 
(A.14)  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
1 4
8
2
2 3 5 6 7
1 4
2
9 10 11 12 13
8
( , ) 1 1
log ( , ), log log
1
log log 6 6 .
M
M
F
F F
f wh I L
v f wh I h N A A
L
A A CU CO
α α
α
α α α α α
α α
α α α α α
α
− −
= + + + +
−
+ + + + +
      
   
  
We allow for gender-specific job opportunities in accordance with the functional forms ((3.2)-(3.6)) 
that were used for single females and males. The estimates of the model parameters for couples have 
previously been reported in Aaberge et al. (2000). 
In this case the households choose among opportunities defined by a vector ( ), , ,M F M Fh h w w . 
Analogously to what we have done with singles, we specify the corresponding density function as  
 
(A.15)  
  
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) if 0, 0
( ) ( ) 1  if 0, 0
, , ,
1 ( ) ( ) if 0, 0 
1 1  if 0, 0 
M M M F F F M F
M M M F M F
M F M F
M F F F M F
M F M F
M M F F
M M
F F
p g h g w p g h g w h h
p g h g w p h h
p h h w w
p p g h g w h h
p p h h
> >
− > =
=
− =
− − = >

>
 
where 
(A.16)    
( )
( )
0
0 1
0
0 1
1
1 exp
1
1 exp
M
M M
F
F F
p
R
p
R
μ μ
μ μ
=
+ − −
=
+ − −
 
are the proportions of opportunities that are market jobs for the husband (M) or, respectively, for the 
wife (F). 
The choice density of an opportunity ( ), , ,M F M Fh h w w  is: 
 
(A.17) 
( ) (
( ) ( )
)( , , ), , , , ,
( , , ), , , , ,
M M F F M F M F M F
M M F F M F M F M F F F M M
v f w h w h I h h p h h w w
v f x y x y I y y p y y x x dx dy dx dy
ϕ =
   
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For the purpose of empirical specification and estimation it is convenient to divide the density ( )p by 
( )(01 1 )0M Fp p− − and define 
(A.18)    
( )
( )
( )( )
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0 0
1
1
1 1
M
M
M
F
F
F
M F
MF
M F
pg
p
pg
p
p pg
p p
=
−
=
−
=
− −
      
     
Now the choice density can be written as follows: 
 
(A.19) 
( ) 0 1 2 1 2( , , ), , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )M M F F M F MF M M M M F F F Fv f w h w h I h h g g h g w g h g w
D
ϕ =  
if both work; 
 
(A.20)  
( ) 0 1 2( ,0, ), ,0 ( ) (M M M M M M M Mv f w h I h g g h g w
D
ϕ = )      
if only the husband works; 
 
(A.21)  
( ) 0 1 2(0, , ),0, ( ) ( )F F F F F F F Fv f w h I h g g h g w
D
ϕ =     
  
if only the wife works; 
 
(A.22)    
( )(0,0, ),0,0v f I
D
ϕ =       
     
if none of them works.  
 
The denominator D is defined as follows:  
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(A.23)  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 2
1 2
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0
(0, 0, ), 0, 0 ( , 0, ), , 0 ( ) ( )
(0, , ), 0, ( ) ( )
( , , ), , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
M M M M M M M M
x
y
F F F F F F F
x
y
M M
F F F
M M F F M F MF M M M M F F F F F M F M M
x
y
D v f I v f x I y g g y g x dx dy
v f x I y g g y g x dx dy
y
y
v f x y x y I y y g g y g x p g y g x dx dy dx dy
>
>
>
>
>
>
= +
+


 
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 Table A.5. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function and the opportunity densities for 
married couples.*) Italy 1993 
Variable Coefficient Estimates 
Preferences: 
 
  
Consumption α1 0.728  (0.057) 
 α2 1.476  (0.174) 
 α3 -0.103  (0.028) 
Husband’s leisure α4 -12.763  (0.869) 
 α5 -1.408  (1.122) 
 α6 0.760  (0.622) 
 α7 -0.097  (0.085) 
Wife’s leisure α8 -8.012  (0.778) 
 α9 74.509 (22.923) 
 α10 -41.608 (12.797) 
 α11 5.881  (1.794) 
 α12 0.302  (0.127) 
 α13 0.277  (0.105) 
Opportunities:    
   Market opportunities    
   Husband μ0M -2.412  (0.222) 
 μ1M 1.821  (0.623) 
   Wife μ0F -0.796  (0.095) 
 μ1F 0.631  (0.102) 
   Hours densities (peak)    
   Husband πM 14.453  (3.328) 
   Wife πF 11.670  (3.504) 
   Wage densities    
   Husband β0M 1.212  (0.080) 
 β1M 0.074  (0.003) 
 β2M 0.024  (0.005) 
 β3M -0.154 ⋅ 10-3 (0.100 ⋅ 10-3) 
 2
Mσ  0.391  (0.006) 
   Wife β0F 0.888  (0.102) 
 β1F 0.101  (0.004) 
 β2F 0.027  (0.008) 
 β3F -0.224 ⋅ 10-3 (0.163 ⋅ 10-3) 
 2
Fσ  0.377  (0.009) 
*) Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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 Table A.6. Labour supply elasticities for single females, single males, married females and mar-
ried males by deciles of household disposable income. Italy 1993. 
Female elasticities Male elasticities  
Family status 
 
Type of 
elasticity 
Decile of 
income 
distribution 
Own wage 
elasticities 
Cross 
elasticities 
Own wage 
elasticities 
Cross 
elasticities 
I 0.71    0.52  
II 0.22    0.18  
III 0.03    0.03  
IV 0.00    0.05  
 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
V 0.00    0.05  
I 1.81    0.28  
II 0.24    0.11  
III 0.03    0.02  
IV 0.02  -0.02  
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of 
total supply of 
hours V 0.00  -0.01  
I 2.90    0.85  
II 0.44    0.28  
III 0.05    0.05  
IV 0.02    0.02  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Singles  
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of 
total supply of 
hours V 0.00    0.04  
I 2.40   0.26   0.04 -0.02 
II 1.35 -0.19   0.05 -0.02 
III 0.54 -0.18   0.01 -0.01 
IV 0.16 -0.16   0.02 -0.01 
 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
V 0.10 -0.15   0.02   0.00 
I 1.60   0.55   0.28   0.08 
II 0.83   0.05   0.12   0.02 
III 0.18 -0.06   0.08 -0.02 
IV 0.04 -0.04   0.06 -0.02 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of 
total supply of 
hours V 0.04 -0.02   0.04 -0.02 
I 4.44   0.82   0.32   0.06 
II 2.31 -0.15   0.17   0.00 
III 0.73 -0.24   0.10 -0.04 
IV 0.20 -0.20   0.08 -0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Couples 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of 
total supply of 
hours V 0.13 -0.17   0.06 -0.02 
Note: I = first decile; II = second decile; III = third to eighth deciles; IV = ninth decile; V = tenth 
decile. 
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